Saturday, November 10, 2007

Plato's meno

For those of you who may not know, Plato’s Socratic meno was a discussion between Socrates and meno about human virtue. It is said that this is one of “Plato’s earliest surviving dialogues”. This particular dialogue took place around 402 B.C., which was about 3 years before Socrates’ on trial an executed. (source)


Other early dialogues by Plato call Socrates trial the Apology. The time that Socrates was in prison waiting to be executed was called the Crito. The death of Socrates is called the Phaedo. (source)


Meno, a young aristocrat from Thessaly, asks how virtue is acquired. In reply, Socrates professes himself unable to answer: since he does not even know what virtue is, how can he know how it is acquired? Meno agrees to tackle the nature of virtue first and offers Socrates a definition, or rather a list of different kinds of virtue. After some argument, he accepts that this is inadequate, and offers another definition – virtue as the power to rule – which is also rejected. In order to help the inquiry along, Socrates gives a short lesson in definition, after which Meno offers his third and final definition of virtue: the desire for fine things and ability to acquire them. When this is refuted, he despairs of ever making any progress in their inquiry: how, he demands, can you look for something of whose nature you are entirely ignorant? Even if you stumble upon the answer, how will you know that this is the thing you did not know before?”(source)


The dialogue of meno is about finding out what virtue is. Socrates askes Meno for a definition of arête. But Socrates says that they can’t figure out if arete can be taught if because they don’t have a clear understanding what it is. (source)


The Socratic paradox is Socrates’ claim that arete is a kind of knowledge. People usually think that arete is more than a knowing, it is also a matter of willing. For example Christians think of sin as knowing what we should do and not doing it. But if virtue is knowledge anybody who really knew good would automatically be good. If Socrates is right that arete is a kind of knowledge, it would be impossible to know what good is and not do it. (source)


Book 1
Book2